Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 70
Issue 2 Summer

Article 9

Summer 1979

Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Temporal
Cross-Sectional Approach
Stephen J. Knorr

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Knorr, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Temporal Cross-Sectional Approach, 70 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 235 (1979)

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

9901-4169/79/70020235S02.00/0
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY

Vol. 70. No. 2
Printedin USA.

Copyright 0 1979 by Northwestern University School of Law

COMMENTS
DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A TEMPORAL CROSSSECTIONAL APPROACH
INTRODUCTION

It has often been argued that the imposition of
capital punishment serves three general purposes:
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. The last
goal dictates against the use of the death penalty,
and the first is often criticized as archaic and
barbaric. By a process of elimination, deterrence is
left as the principal theory lending support to and
serving as a rationale for this most extreme form of
punishment. For this reason, "deterrence has received an increasing amount of attention from
scholars in a variety of fields."'
Particular attention has been focused on the
utility of the application of capital punishment as
an effective deterrent force. Various statistical
methodologies have been employed in attempts to
measure and test the extent of the effects that the
risk of death has on potential and actual murderers.
To date, the empirical findings have been generally
2
inconclusive.
There are several reasons why such studies have
been criticized for only marginally contributing to
the debate over the efficacy of capital punishment
as a means of deterring homicides. First, the data
being used for the statistical tests are not generally
considered to be random samples approximating
the true population values. 3 Second, the question
of which variables should be used is still open. One
approach may examine capital punishment as a
deterrent force by itself, while another methodology may phrase the issue in terms of which punishI F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERENCE 2-3 (1973).
2 Most of the studies are discussed in this study; for

example, see Ehrlich, The Deterrentof CapitalPunishment:A
Question of Life and De4th, 65 AM. EcoN. REV.397 (1975);
Forst, The Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment A CrossState
Analysis ofthe 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1977); Passell,
The DeterrentEffect of the Death Penalty: A StatisticalTest, 28
STAN. L. REv. 61, 66 (1975); Sellin, Experiments with
Abolition, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS 122 (1967) (hereinafter

cited as Sellin Experiments); Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionists States, in

CAPITAL

PUNISHMENTS

ment, death or life imprisonment, is the superior
deterrent for policy purposes. Third, even if the
death penalty is assumed to be an effective deterrent force, it would be difficult to prove since
murders which are actually deterred will not be
reflected in the crime statistics. In effect, crime
data reflect those murders for which the threat of
the punishment of death either did not represent
a deterrent force to prevent the crime or was not
considered at all.
The actualuse of capital punishment itself as an
acceptable form of societal penalty does not rest on
solid grounds either. It is important to recognize
that even if it is assumed that the potential fear of
death can deter a crime, this in itself may not be a
necessary and sufficient reason for use of the death
penalty.4 The execution of a convicted offender is
not only the most severe form of punishment possible, but it is also permanent. Uncertainty reflecting the balancing of the high cost of imposing the
death penalty against the as yet unproven gains
resulting from the imposition of death in turn
produces two further uncertainties. First, the imposition of the death penalty, if it truly has no
deterrent effect, results in the probability of a net
loss to society while achieving no goal other than
retribution. Second, even if a potential victim's life
is saved because of the deterrence impact, there
will be a net gain to society only if the life of an
6
offender is valued differently from that of a victim.
These questions are essentially moral and value
judgments which even the best empirical findings
cannot be expected to answer in any substantive
way.
Studies of deterrence and capital punishment
rest on a crucial assumption which may be unwarranted: men are rational in their behavior. This
involves two related factors directly impinging
upon the proposition that potential murderers generally react the same to different types of situations

135

4 Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime?,

(1967)
(hereinafter cited as Sellin Homicides).
3

See Note, Crime Statistics-Can They Be Trusted, 1 AM.

CriM. L. REv. 1045 (1973), for a general discussion of the
available data and the shortcomings of these sources.

ESr

5

.J.

36 PUB. INTER103, 108 (1974).
Van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 60

CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 141, 146-47 (1969).
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and stimuli-a rational thought process and
knowledge. First, if the crime is one of passion or
provocation as opposed to premeditation and deliberation, as many if not most murders are considered to be, then the threat of a particular punishment or the difference between types of punishment will be effectively nullified.6 In other words,
the relevant variable is actually only that part of
all homicides and non-negligent manslaughters
that is the result of deliberation, malice and aforethought. Thus, although there is evidence that the
threat of punishment does deter "burglary and
other property crimes, it is unlikely to have much
effect on crimes of impulse, such as rape and many
murders.",7 The only satisfactory solution to this
problem is data which reflect only murders resulting from rational thought processes and choices;
unfortunately no such data exist. The other prong
of the rational man theory involves the assumption
of knowledge on the part of the potential offender.
That is, even assuming a potential murderer is
calculating and deliberate in his actions,
[flor punishment to have a deterrent effect, potential criminals must have at least some information
about its likely severity and frequency. Presumably,
the effect of variations in punishment would be
greater if criminals were well-informed than if they
were not. In practice, of course, potential criminals
these things, but
are not very well-informed about
8
they do have some information.
The issues, shortcomings, and questions raised
above must be recognized in order to evaluate
properly and objectively the results of empirical
situation. Solutions to many of these may well
involve an individual moral resolution of the values
6 As United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan,
concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971),
said:
It is not denied that many, and probably most,
capital crimes cannot be deterred by threat of punishment. Thus the argument can apply only to those
who think rationally about the commission of capital crimes. Particularly is that true when the potential criminal, under this argument, must not only
consider the risk of punishment, but also distinguish
between two possible punishments. The concern,
then, is with a particular type of potential criminal,
the rational person who will commit a capital crime
knowing that the punishment islong-term imprisonment, which may well be for the rest of his life, but
will not commit the crime knowing that the punishment is death.
Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring).
7Tullock, supra note 4, at 108.
8
Id.at 109.
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involved, a task not attempted in this study. Moreover, the fact that the statistical and theoretical

underpinnings of such studies have been subjected
to such criticism does not mean there is little or no
information to be obtained from their findings. On

the contrary, even given these limitations, such
research has resulted in "modest increments in

understandings."' Any additional empirical evidence, even if suggestive rather than definitive,"
contributes information which is invaluable in

trying to determine whether capital punishment
really represents a viable and effective means for
society to vindicate its values.
The focus of this comment will thus be two-fold:

first, to analyze those studies which have attempted
to verify empirically the existence of a deterrent
effect of capital punishment, and second, to present
the results of new empirical research which has
tried to take into account many of the criticisms
directed at the analyses to be discussed. The issues
highlighted above, as well as others to be raised
later, serve the useful function of placing these
statistical studies in their proper perspective by
indicating the problems raised by an empirical
approach. There is at the same time, however, a
realization that this type of research may yield
9In this regard, one writer has doncluded that "we
have no right to risk additional future victims of murder
for the sake of sparing convicted murderers; on the
contrary, our moral obligation is to risk the possible
ineffectiveness of executions." Van den Haag, supra note
5, at 147.
ioZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 3.
tId.

12In Rudolph v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d
denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), Justice Gold662 (1963), cert.
berg, dissenting from denial of certiorari, observed:
The following questions, inter alia, seem relevant
and worthy of argument and consideration:
(1) In light of the trend both in this country and
throughout the world against punishing rape by
death, does the imposition of the death penalty by
those States which retain it for rape violate "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
[our] maturing society," or "standards of decency
more or less universally accepted?"
(2) Is the taking of human life to protect a value
other than human life consistent with the constitutional proscription against "punishments which by
their excessive ...severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged?"
(3) Can the permissible aims of punishment (e.g.,
deterrence, isolation, rehabilitation) be achieved as
effectively by punishing rape less severely than by
death (e.g., by life imprisonment); if so, does the
imposition of the death penalty for rape constitute
"unnecessary cruelty?"
375 U.S. at 889-91 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
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information which may contribute to the goal of
satisfactorily resolving these issues.

an economic approach to murder, Ehrlich constructed a supply function of murders1 7 and used
it to test the basic hypothesis that as the use of
ISAAC EHRLICH AND DETERRENCE
capital punishment increases, the rate of homicides
Until recently, very little had been done in the will decrease. Each murderer was hypothesized to
way of statistically testing the deterrence hypothe- have a utility function which reflects the direct
sis in a rigorous manner. The studies that had costs of planning and executing the crime as well
evaluated capital punishment as an effective means as the risks of incurring detrimental losses if appreof preventing murders tended to analyze the issues hended, convicted and/or executed. All other
on a non-empirical level, relying on sociological, things being equal, it was theorized a rational
economic, demographic and psychological theories. offender will exhibit behavior designed to maxiThe studies that were statistically-oriented did not mize his utility and will commit the crime only if
involve sophisticated models, and the great major- the expected utility is greater than the expected
ity rejected the hypothesis that the threat of death utility of the second-best or second-choice action.
does affect the commission of homicides. In addiGiven these basic behavioral assumptions, Ehrtion, Supreme Court decisions, principally Furman lich then isolated for statistical purposes three dev. Georgia1 3 and Gregg v. Georgia,4 not only served to terrence variables: the probability of being apprefuel the debate over capital punishment, but also hended, the conditional probability of being conseemed to stimulate social scientists and econome- victed if apprehended, and the conditional probatricians to redouble their efforts in attempting to bility of being executed given conviction. In terms
isolate and identify what, if any, deterrent effect of actual effectiveness, Ehrlich ranked apprehenexists. The potential utility of such evidence was sion first and execution last on the basis of the
underscored by the references made in the amicus magnitude of the corresponding elasticity.18 As he
curiae brief of the Solicitor General of the United noted, "On the basis of this analysis, it can be
15
States in Fowler v. North Carolina.
The brief cited predicted that while the execution of guilty muras principal evidence of the positive deterrent effect derers deter acts of murder, ceteris paribus, the apof capital
punishment a 1975 study by Isaac Ehr- prehension and conviction of guilty murderers is
6
lich.1
likely to have an even larger deterrent effect."'19
,Recognized as the principal proponent of the
In addition to these deterrence measures, Ehrlich
value of capital punishment as a tool of deterrence, also included in his equation economic variables
Ehrlich has tested several sophisticated economet- for the United States, labor force participation rate
ric models, all purporting to demonstrate that the (the per cent of the population having or actively
deterrence hypothesis should be accepted. In re- seeking employment), the unemployment rate, per
viewing the pro-deterrence literature, primary at- capita permanent income, and age distribution.
tention will be paid to Ehrlich's research; his meth- The deterrence variables actually inserted in the
odological approach, findings, and conclusions will
be discussed, analyzed, and criticized.
17Ehrlich's function postulates that the supply of homicides will be determined by the interaction of deterrence,
Ehrlich's Research: Accepting the Deterrence Hypothesis
economic, and demographic/social variables. That is,
Ehrlich's original study was published in 1975 assuming all other factors remain constant, an increase
and quickly became a center of controversy. Using in the rate of execution (a conviction or apprehension)
will result in a decrease in the ratio of homicides. This
simple supply function is then combined with the nega13408 U.S. 238 (1971). The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 tive social demand for murder and asserts as a basis for
decision, held that the imposition of the death penalty in the analysis that the offender will respond to certain
a murder case constituted cruel and unusual punishment incentives included in the supply equation. Id.
8An elasticity basically measures the percentage
in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments,
and concluded that the punishment of death does not change in one variable brought about by the percentage
invariably violate the Constitution.
change in another or the responsiveness of the quantity
14428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Supreme Court upheld the demanded of a variable to change in its price. If the
sentence of death in an armed robbery and murder elasticity is greater than, less than, or equal to one, the
conviction against the challenge of cruel and unusual relationships (usually demand) is said to be relatively
punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth elastic, inelastic, or unitary elastic, respectively. For adamendments and concluded that the punishment of ditional information, see JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC MEmHdeath does not invariably violate the Constitation.
ODS (1972) or CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATH""428 U.S. 904 (1976).
EMATICAL ECONOMICS (1967).
16Ehrlich, note 2 supra.
19Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 402.
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equation were constructed using proxies. The probability of being apprehended was measured by
clearance rates (estimates of all murders "cleared"
by the arrest of a suspect), the probability of conviction was the fraction of all persons charged with
murder over those who were convicted of it, and
the probability of execution had different measures
involving lagged and current values of executions
and convictions. The left-hand or dependent variable is the homicide rate, represented by the number of non-negligent manslaughters and murders
per 100,000 persons.
The structural equation actually estimated is of
the Cobb-Douglas variety, meaning that the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables may
be interpreted as elasticities. 2° To correct for interdependencies among the murder rate and the probabilities of conviction and execution, Ehrlich utilized a regression technique known as two-stage
least squares, 21 which merely involves the insertion
of certain exogenous or instrumental variables into
the equation to solve this problem of simultaneity.
The equation is estimated for the United States for
the period 1933-1969 and consists of variables in
modified first-difference form (autoregressive trans-

20A Cobb-Douglas production function takes the form
of the following (expressed in Ehrlich's terms):

QiN = C*P *P a*P }¢*UP'*LP"*Yg'*A# exp (vi)
where Q/N rate of non-negligent manslaughter and
murder
P.
probability of apprehension
Pa,, probability of being convicted
probability of being executed
P.,/
labor force participation rate
L
U
unemployment rate
permanent income per capita (Friedman
Yp
measure)
A
per cent of population between ages of 1424
C
constant term
disturbance term assumed to have first orvI
der serial correlation
When the equation is estimated, the estimated coefficients are the exponent (a and /3) and may be interpreted
as elasticities. That is, a3 represents the responsiveness of
Q/N to a unit percentage change in Pl,. Id. at 406-07.
21An increase in the execution rate will presumably
result in lower jury convictions for capital crimes, thus,
if rising executions cause a decrease in convictions, then
the perceived effects of executions on the homicide rate
might appear positive. Two-stage least squares allows the
effect of the two variables to be separated in a systematic
way.
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formations of the original variables measured in
natural logarithms).22

Ehrlich found that the regression results indicated that his hypothetical ranking of the effect of
the deterrence variables is correct and that the

signs of the estimated coefficients (elasticities) and
their magnitudes conform to general theoretical

expectations. 23 In defense of his techniques, Ehrlich
contended that his results are
robust with respect to the functional form of the
regression equation. In addition, estimating the
regression equations by introducing the levels of the
relevant variables rather than their modified first
differences (that is, assuming no serial correlation in
the error term) artificially reduces the standard
errors of the regression coefficients as would be
24
expected on purely statistical grounds.
In terms of the implications for the trade-off between murders and executions, Ehrlich's results

suggest that every additional execution would save
the lives of seven or eight potential murder victims.
In evaluating his own findings, Ehrlich did not

claim to have proved the deterrence hypothesis
since he recognized the possibility of bias due to
the absence of data on the severity of alternative
punishments, although he did not know which way
this would bias his results. On the contrary, Ehrlich

claimed merely a tentative acceptance of the hypothesis. As Ehrlich maintained, "[I]n view of the
new evidence presented here, one cannot reject the
hypothesis that law enforcement activities in general and executions in particular do exert a deterrent effect on acts of murder. Strong inferences to
investigation apthe contrary drawn from earlier
'' 5
pear to have been premature.
In addition to this time series analysis, Erhlich
also tested in a separate study the deterrence hy2
pothesis using cross-sectional data. The focus was
on the cross-sectional patterns of murders and executions for the years 1940 and 1950. The principal

advantage to this analysis as compared to the first
study is the availability of data for variables not
• See Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: An Assessment of the Estimates, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ON CRIME RATES, 336-52 (1978).

supra note 2, at 411.
Id. at 412.
25
Id.at 416.
26Ehrlich, CapitalPunishmentand Deterrence: Some Further
Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741
(1977).
23Ehrlich,
24
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available over time, such as estimates of the severity
of punishment (median time spent in prison prior
to first release or the actual length of the prison
sentence) for murder and other crimes.
This approach rests on key.structural relations:
first, the supply function for offenses, and second,
the demand for enforcement activities. The typical
deterrence variables were specified again as prices,
costs, or negative rewards. The explanatory variables were grouped into two categories-deterrence
and economic/demographic. The former consisted
of the probability of conviction measured by the
ratio of convictions per number of homicides, the
median time spent in prison prior to first release,
and the probability of execution measured by the
ratio of the average number of executions in the
last "x" number of years to the number of convictions for murder in the current year. The demographic/economic variables included the per cent
of nonwhites in the population, the per cent of
families with incomes less than one-half of the
median family income for the state, the median
family income lagged one year, the per cent of the
population between ages fifteen and twenty-four,
and the per cent of the urban population to the
state population.
The estimation technique was ordinary least
squares;2 7 two-stage least squares could not be used
because of data exigencies. Supply functions were
estimated separately for executing states as well as
the full sample because the estimated levels of the
conditional risks of execution in abolitionist states
were effectively zero. Tests for homoscedasticity
(changing variance in the error term) proved negative, so generalized least squares estimators were
obtained by weighting all the variables by the
square roots of either the urban, state, or relevant
sample populations.
The regression results again indicated that the
three deterrence variables (apprehension, conviction, and execution) are statistically significant and
negatively related to the rate of homicides. The
elasticity of the rate of homicides with respect to
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the conditional probability of conviction was, as
hypothesized, greater than the elasticity with respect to the c6nditional probability of execution.
The inclusion of a dummy variable28 in the full
sample equation to account for abolitionist and
retentionist states permitted a' test to be made of
their statistical difference. As Ehrlich stated, "the
only valid inference to be drawn from the estimated
effect of [the dummy variable] is that it indicates
the existence of a statistically significant difference
between the mean rates of murder in executing
and non-executing states after the effects of the
other variables ... have been accounted for." 29 On
the basis of these results, which largely confirmed
and reinforced the findings and conclusions of his
time series study, Ehrlich concluded that
it is noteworthy that all the deterrence variables
examined in this analysis yield the expected results
in connection with murder and other crimes, and
that the coefficients associated with explanatory
variables other than constant terms appear statistically indistinguishable across different samples as
well as across
subsets of executing and non-executa°
ing states.

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, Ehrlich's
work has had a considerable impact on the capital
punishment-deterrence debate. First, his models
represent the first sophisticated econometric attempts at isolating and evaluating the marginal
effect of an execution on the murder rate. Second,
this conclusion that the execution of a convicted
murderer will deter potential murderers and thus
save the lives of would-be victims cannot be regarded too lightly, despite the existence of a number of criticisms of his work tending to diminish
the actual impact of his findings. Given these
criticisms (to be examined in the next section) and
the questionable validity of the statistical and theoretical assumptions underlying both Ehrlich's
methodology and more generally the application
of econometrics to this problem (discussed in the
previous section), Ehrlich's work cannot be said to
have proven the deterrence hypothesis, but it has
cast some doubt on the belief that capital punishment no longer serves any of the legitimate or

2 Briefly, ordinary least squares "is a method of developing an equation which relates one variable (such as
a company's sales) to one or more other variables which
should explain the first (such as price, economic demands,
28The dummy variable assigns a value of I to retencompetition, etc.). This method is mathematically contrived so that the resulting combinations of explanatory tionist states and a 0 to abolitionist states. The purpose
variables produces the smallest error between the historic is to see if there is any significant difference in the legal
actual values and those estimated by the regression." status of the death penalty among states.
2 Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 757.
McLagan, A Non-econometrician's Guide to Econometrics, 8
30 Id. at 778.
Bus. ECON. 38 (1973).
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historical societal goals of retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence.
CRITICS OF EHRLICH AND His RESPONSES

There are three basic categories in which criticisms of Ehrlich's study may be grouped: data
imperfections, methodological problems, and questionable assumptions. The most basic attack is
leveled at the inadequacies of the data used in the
study. Ehrlich relied on Federal Bureau of Investigation data as reported in the Uniform Crime
Reports compiled annually by voluntary submission by local police departments. At best, these
statistics represent no more than a sampling of
total crime, and although this source may be the
best set of nationwide data around, there is still
much doubt as to its reliability for econometric
use.

.31

Related to the issue of data reliability is the time
period and frequency used in the actual regression.
Ehrlich's time series analysis spanned the period
1933-1969 and involved annual data for the
United States on an aggregate level. However, the
inclusion of the years after 1960 may have produced a deterrent effect which is spurious in nature.

The last execution in the United States (excluding
the recent Gary Gilmore incident in Utah) took
place in 1967. Over time, the absolute numbers of
executions have been decreasing: 1,667 for 193039, 1,284 for 1940-49, 717 for 1950-59, and 191
for 1960-69 (of which 145 occurred between 1960
and 1962).32 Although this distinct downward
trend presents problems in itself (for example, the
difficulty in accounting for political decisions, social factors, and value changes which might lie
behind this decline in the use of the death penalty),
it is clear from the figures that inclusion of the
1960's data may distort the results since executions
were declining while homicide rates were increasing significantly. 3 That is, Ehrlich's use of the
1960's data, the period when the death penalty
was discontinued as a means of punishment, may
have produced spurious estimated coefficients of
the regression variables. A recent study found this
problem to be of a critical nature:
:" Bowers & Pierce, 7he Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac
YALE L.J. 187
(1975).
:r2Board of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics: Capital Punishment 1930-68. 8 (1969).
' These trends raise the important question of whether
and to what extent the decline in and the end of executions during the 1960's caused the sharp rise in the
homicide rate. See Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22,
at 345.

Ehrlich's Research and Capital Punishment, 85
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In fact, the real contribution to the strength of
Ehrlich's statistical finding lies in the simple graph
of the upsurge of the homicide rate after 1962,
coupled with the fall in the execution rate in the
same period. The whole statistical story lies in this
simple pairing of these observations and not in the
theoretical utility model, the econometric type specification, or the use of best econometric method.
Everything else is relatively superficial and dominated by this simple statistical observation.3
Moreover, this criticism of Ehrlich's research has
been accepted by Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Gregg:

The most compelling criticism of the Ehrlich study
is that its conclusions are extremely sensitive to the
choice of the time period included in the regression
analysis. Analysis of Ehrlich's data reveals that all
empirical support for the deterrent effect of capital
punishment disappears when the five most recent
years are removed from his time series-that is to
say, whether a decrease in the execution rate corresponds to an increase or decrease in the murder rate
depends on the ending point of the sample period.
This finding has cast severe doubts on the reliability
of Ehrlich's tentative conclusions.3
Aside from the criticisms directed at Ehrlich's
time series, there have been criticisms aimed at the
methodology employed by Ehrlich in his studies.
One alleged flaw involves the procedural aspects
used by Ehrlich in constructing his model. As
indicated in one study:
[Ehrlich's] analysis is extraordinary at least insofar
as it employs a vast array of manipulations: to
create values of missing data, to test alternative
time-lag structures to reduce bias or efficiency loss
associated with autoregressive disturbances, to avoid
undefined values of central interest, and to test
alternative systems of simultaneity. 36
Second, even small errors in estimates of any of
the variables used in constructing the deterrence
variables could produce an unusually strong but
spurious appearance of a deterrent effect.3 7 Measurement errors tend to bias the regression coefficients towards zero. In Ehrlich's study, the "errors
in these crucial variables-(homicides, probability
of apprehension, probability of conviction)-all
appear to work in such a way as to bias the

'4

:

Id. at 344-45.
4 28

U.S. at 235-36 (footnote.'s omitted).

"4Klein, Forsit & Filatov, supra note 22, at 339.
'n

Zeiscl, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts

and Faith, 1976 Sup. CT. R.v. 317, 335 (1976).
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coefficient of (the execution rate) negatively. ' ' ss In
response, Ehrlich has contended that even if these
measurement errors do exist, they would generally
lead to the underestimation in a regression analysis
of the true effects of an explanatory variable subject
to random measurement imperfections.s In either
case, the root of the problem is still the lack of
reliable historical period, a defect not likely to be
corrected.
The national approach adopted by Ehrlich in
his first study tends to conceal the impact and
effects of state and regional differences. For instance, on an aggregate level, if one state shows an
increase in executions and another a decrease in
homicides, the overall effect might appear to be
one of deterrence which would not exist at all.'
Furthermore, a time series approach lacks many of
the desirable properties of a cross-sectional analysis
which
provides the potential for a more thoroughly controlled estimate of the effect of changes in elasticities
on homicides not only by way of the existence of
large inter-regional variation in several of the included variables, the incorporation of regional
dummy variable, and a corresponding reduction in
aggregation bias, but also by way of the opportunity
to include a term-of-imprisonment variable, which
is not available in time series. 4'
The functional specification used by Ehrlich has
also been criticized. Ehrlich assumed a multipli*1Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 348-49.
:3Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence andInference, 85 YALE L.J.
209, 213 (1975).
""Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten
Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170, 176 (1975). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
recognized this point explicitly:
It has been suggested, for example, that the study
is defective because it compares execution and homicide rates on a nationwide, rather than a state-bystate, basis. The aggregation of data from all
states-including those that have abolished the
death penalty-obscures the relationship between
murder and execution rates. Under Ehrlich's methodology, a decrease in the execution risk in one
State combined with an increase in the murder rate
in another State would, all other things being equal,
suggest a deterrent effect that quite obviously would
not exist. Indeed, a deterrent effect would be suggested if, once again all other things being equal,
one State abolished the death penalty and experienced no change in the murder rate, while another
State experienced an increase in the murder rate.
Id. U.S. at 234-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
"' Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 341.

cative equation in the nature of the Cobb-Douglas
production function; 42 the regression was estimated
using the natural logarithmic values of the variables as a means of transforming the specified
relationship into an equivalent linear form. Some
studies, attempting to duplicate Ehrlich's work but
not using log transformations have concluded that
the deterrence impact is a statistical artifact, 4in3
essence a result of the functional specification.
While it is true that the incorrect use of the logarithmic form can cause relatively small values for
the risk of execution to appear to be statistical
aberrations influencing the regression fit, this same
problem may exist with respect to a linear form for
the same values." The data available for a study
will often play a crucial role in determining
whether a non-linear specification should be used.
In Ehrlich's case, there does not appear to be any
reason dictating against the use of a non-linear
specification. In fact, Ehrlich claimed that his ap-.
proach represents a superior format because the
magnitude of the errors in his data is approximately proportional to the level of the variables
the data are purporting to measure. For this reason,
Ehrlich believed his results are not exclusively dependent on the specific functional form chosen but
are basically
unaffected qualitatively by this
45
choice.
In any regression using ordinary least squares, a
critical property is the inclusion of all relevant
variables. Omitted variables will seriously bias the
estimated coefficients of the deteirence variables as
well as the associated standard errors." Ehrlich
himself admitted the presence of this statistical
problem in his time series analysis. In his crosssectional study, Ehrlich included variables such as
the severity of imprisonment for murder and other
crimes which are not available over time. 47 The
variables omitted from the time series regression
equation are first, a proxy measure for individuals
who are undeterred by social sanctions against
murder for other reasons such as the absence of
strong family ties or lack of friends, 4 8 and second,
variables representing migration from rural to ur42 See note 20 supra.
43See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 199; Baldus
& Cole, supra note 40, at 185.
"Peck, The DeterrentEffect ofCapitalPunishment: Ehrlich
and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359, 361 (1976).
4Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 217-18.
4Passell, supra note 2, at 66.
47 Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 742.
48 Passell, supra note 2, at 66.
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ban areas, per capita ownership of guns,
and the
49
level of violent crimes against property.
Ehrlich found that conviction rates would decrease as executions increased. 5° Given the nature
of ordinary least squares regression analysis, the
trade-off between the homicide rate and the execution rate depends upon holding constant all the
other variables in the system, including the apprehension and conviction rates."' Since both of these
deterrence variables were found to have negative
effects on the homicide rate, this implies that the
effect of a decline in the conviction rate will offset
the effect of an increase in the execution rate, and
in fact will outweigh it given the magnitude of
their elasticities. 52 Given this reasoning, it is consistent with the conclusion that an increase in
executions will cause a net increase, not decrease,
in the homicide rate.53
The final criticism may be the most damaging
to the credibility of Ehrlich's findings, and is directly related to the earlier criticism concerning the
time period chosen. Econometric theory teaches
that if the results of a time series regression are an
accurate representation of the underlying causal
processes, then the values of the estimated coefficients will be independent of specified time periods.
Although neither Ehrlich nor his critics did any
rigorous testing for structural changes over the
sample period, one study, attempting to duplicate
Ehrlich's equation, found that all evidence of deterrence disappears when the last five years are
dropped from the regression. 54 This should not be
too surprising since inclusion of the 1960's in the
time interval may drastically distort the results
because executions dropped dramatically or were
eliminated while homicide rates increased significantly.s In examining the inclusion of the 1960's
49 Baldus & Cole, supra note 40, at 180.
0 Ehrlich postulated that any exogenous factor causing a decline in the severity of punishment for murder
via a decline in the conditional probability of execution
given conviction will increase the probability of conviction, since the marginal costs of conviction will decrease
but its marginal revenue will increase. That is, the rates
of execution and conviction are substitutes with respect
to the costs of each activity. Ehrlich, supranote 2, at 40506.
51Passell, supra note 2, at 64.
52 The

sign of the elasticities (estimated coefficients)

and their magnitude conform to the general theoretical
expectations that the elasticity with respect to the apprehension ratio is the largest, the execution ratio elasticity
the smallest. Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 401, 411.
53Baldus & Cole, supra note 40, at 182; Passell, supra
note 2, at 64.
54 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 197-98.
55 Sit text accompanying note 28 supra.
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in a regression analysis, a recent study has concluded that "ending the practice of capital punishment in the 1960's does not constitute a controlled
experiment from which one can safely draw conclusions about deterrence by observing only homicides and executions. Factors other than the ending
of capital punishment severely affected the homicide rate during this period." 56
Ehrlich, however, did do some testing of his
temporal specification by dropping some of the
earlier and later years. His test results showed no
appreciable change in the elasticity of the homicide
rate with respect to the execution variable. 57 However, Ehrlich has indicated that this criticism of his
model is unjustified because "[slelective elimination of a sufficient number of observations from a
regression analysis is a virtually foolproof method
for reversing any
5 single result derived from an
original sample."
Moreover, Ehrlich has claimed that the elimination of the data points relating to murders in the
1960's (over 17% of Ehrlich's sample) amounts to,
in effect, the selective, non-random exclusion of
observations crucial to an efficient estimation. This
is especially true when the observations omitted
(1960's) significantly reduce the variability in the
estimate of the execution rate. The rate of change
in executions had been stable over the 1940's and
1950's but declined sharply in the 1960's, accurately reflecting the true risk of execution. Thus,
eliminating these years and the corresponding variability seriously affects the magnitude of the estimated coefficients by reducing the overall variability in the estimates of the execution rate. 9
This change in the coefficients resulting from the
choice of various time intervals could be the result
of a structural change or shift over time, or the
result of an incorrect specification of the model for
the entire time period. ° In any case, the instability
of the coefficients indicates there is a possibility
that the deterrent effect is spurious. Ehrlich should
have more rigorously tested the structural stability
of his equation; the fact that he may have done so
but did not present the results casts a shadow on
his findings.
Given Ehrlich's findings, the criticisms of his
work, and his rebuttals, it is difficult to formulate
and defend any position regarding the deterrence
"6Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 345.

57 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 197; Ehrlich, supra
note 2, at 409-16.
8 Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 214.
9Id. at 214-16.
r0 Peck, supra note 44, at 361.
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hypothesis. A recent study has wisely concluded
that
it seems unthinkable to us to base decisions in the
use of the death penalty on Ehrlich's findings, as
the Solicitor General of the United States has urged.
They simply are not sufficiently powerful, robust,
or tested at this stage to warrant use in such an
important case.... It is not that Ehrlich's estimates
are demonstrably wrong; it is merely that they are
too uncertain and must, at best, be interpreted as
tentative at this stage.
There is nothing wrong with Ehrlich's particular
numerical findings. His arithmetic is correct; his
formulation is imaginative; but application to the
most serious of issues is premature. In short, we see
too many plausible explanations for his finding a
deterrent effect other than the theory that capital
punishment deters murder.
EVIDENCE OF

No

DETERRENT EFFECT

Much of the recent literature on the topic of
capital punishment and deterrence has focused on
Ehrlich's findings, analyzing and critiquing his
hypothesis and methodology. This interest has
stimulated the development of several econometric
models designed to test and identify the causal
relationship between the death penalty and homicides, usually with a goal of refuting Ehrlich's
conclusions. These modeling attempts are sophisticated additions to the graphical and statistical
analyses of the 1960's and 1970's, which could not
find any significantly acceptable evidence of deterrence. The studies and findings of these groups (the
chartists-comparativists and the econometricians)
are deserving of recognition and are discussed
briefly in this section. While the impact of these
research projects has not been as strong as Ehrlich's, it is nevertheless important to be aware of
the fact that statistical evidence contrary to Ehrlich's does exist. It must be borne in mind, of
course, that neither position has been conclusively
established or accepted.
Chartist-Comparativists: Sellin and the Matching
Technique
The principal studies concluding that the use of
capital punishment does not deter homicides have
been done by Thorsten Sellin.62 His first attempt
to isolate a deterrent effect was simply an examination of what happened with respect to the homicide rates in those states which abolished the death
61Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 358.
6 Sellin Experiments, note 2 supra; Sellin Homicides,
note 2 supra.

penalty and later reinstituted the punishment. Using a comparative analytical scheme, Sellin concluded that "there is no evidence that the abolition
of the death penalty generally causes an increase
in criminal homicides or that its reintroduction is
followed by a decline.' ' 3
Recognizing that few states have changed policies in this manner and thus that this finding did
not have great probative value, Sellin extended the
scope of his inquiry by comparing contiguous retentionist and abolitionist states. This implicitly
assumes that neighboring states are similar in terms
of economic, social, political, and demographic
conditions, an assumption that is difficult to justify
empirically. The purpose of this "matching" technique was to test the hypothesis that states that
have abolished the death penalty have lower homicide rates than states that have retained capital
punishment. The rate of murders and non-negligent manslaughters were compared over the period
1920 to 1963. Since actual capital murders are
hidden in the data but are the relevant variable, it
was necessary for Sellin to make the implicit and
crucial, though unproven, assumption that the proportion of capital to total murders remains constant over time. On the basis of this comparative
analysis, Sellin found that
[an inspection of the figures shows (1) that the level
of the rates is not the same in all regions; (2) that
within each group of contiguous states it would be
impossible to identify the abolitionist state, were it
not designated as such; and (3) that the trends of
the rates of the states compared are similar. The
conclusion is inevitable that the presence of the
death penalty-in law or practice-does not influence homicide death rates.6
Other studies have adopted the approach and
methodology of Sellin and have arrived at the same
results. For instance, Chambliss reported that a
preponderance of his evidence indicates that capital punishment does not act as a deterrent to
murder.r 5 His comparative research demonstrated
63Sellin Experiments, supra note 2, at 124.
6 Sellin Homicides, supra note 2, at 136. Sellin paired
sets of contiguous states in order to match the homicide
rates of retentionist and abolitionist states. Six pairings
were examined, the abolitionist states being listed first:
Maine with Vermont and New Hampshire, Rhode Island
with Massachusetts and Connecticut, Minnesota and
Iowa with Wisconsin, Michigan with Indiana and Ohio,
Kansas with Missouri and Colorado, and North Dakota
and South Dakota (until 1939) with Nebraska.
6sChambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of

Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 703 (1968). In reaching

his conclusions, Chambliss compared the number of per-
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three facts: first, that murder rates had remained
constant from 1951-1966 despite a trend away from
the use of capital punishment; second, that within
the United States, there is no significant difference
in the murder rate between abolitionist and retentionist states, and third, that the possible consequences of the act of murder are not considered by
the murderer at the time of the commission of the
crime.
Similarly, a research effort by Savitz analyzed
the homicide rate in Philadelphia before and after
highly publicized executions in order to test the
hypothesis that the deterrence impact will be most
effective during the days following executions in a
locality where the crime was committed and/or
where the criminal was known.6 This study concluded that "there was no significant decrease or
increase in the murder rate following the imposition of67the death penalty on four separate occasions."
These studies are the most reliable non-econometric evidence that the death penalty serves no
deterrence purpose. Sellin's findings have been
cited as superior to Ehrlich's because of the existence of several significant factors in his study, but
absent from Ehrlich's: (1) the choice of variables
and the way the threat of capital punishment is
measured; (2) the use of state rather than national
data; (3) the techniques used to control for the
influence of other variables affecting homicide
6
rates; and (4) the consistency of the findings. 8
Sellin's work has also found support and acceptsons executed with the homicide rate for each year from
1951 to 1966 and found that the murder rate did not
appear to be connected with executions. Second, Chainbliss did a Sellin-type analysis and concluded that the
annual average murder rate in selected contiguous states
(each pairing having one retentionist and one abolitionist
state) were not significantly different.
66Savitz, A Study in Capital Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 338 (1958). Specifically, Savitz examined four case
studies, concentrating on the eight-week period before
and after the sentence of death to determine what the
effect would be on the commission of capital crimes. On
an individual basis, Savitz found somewhat of a decrease
after sentencing, yet when the data from all four were
combined, the impact was insignificant. In the period
before imposition, 43 total capital crimes were reported
of which 23 were definitely capital in nature and 20 were
possibles; in the period after, 41 total capital crimes
occurred, 28 being defined as definites. The total decrease
in capital crimes measured 4%, caused principally by a
sharp decline in possible capital crimes.
67Id. at 341.
68For a more detailed comparison of Ehrlich and
Sellin, see Baldus & Cole, supra note 40, at 185-86.
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ance in judicial quarters. In a Massachusetts decision addressing the question of the imposition of
death in a rape-murder case, a concurring judge

argued that a
review of the available studies and other materials
cited reveals no firm indication that capital punishment acts as a superior deterrent to homicide than
other available punishments. At best the evidence
is equivocal. I am thus unable to find that the
Commonwealth has a compelling interest in deterrence which cannot adequately be served by other
6
less restrictive means of punishment. 9
Justice Marshall also examined Sellin's statistical
evidence and concluded in Furman that "Sellin's
statistics demonstrate that there is no correlation
between the murder rate and70the presence or absence of the capital sanction."
Despite the general acceptance of his findings,
Sellin's research, like Ehrlich's, has been subjected
to critical review. The major criticism by econometricians charges that Sellin's methods do not
present a systematic test of the main implications
of general deterrence theory; that is, that potential
offenders respond to incentives. In this respect,
Sellin's use of the legal status of the death penalty
as a means of comparison has been deemed misleading since the relevant variable is the actual risk
of execution. 71 More specifically, Ehrlich has concluded that Sellin's efforts are nothing more than
informal tests of the sign of the simple correlation
between the legal status of the death penalty and
the murder rate across states and over time in a few
states. Studies performing this test have not considered systematically the actual enforcement of the
death penalty, which may be a far more important
factor affecting an offender's behavior than the legal
status of the death penalty. Moreover, these studies
have generally ignored other parameters characterizing law enforcement activity against murders,
such as the probability of apprehension and the
conditional probability of conviction, which appear
to be systematically related to the probability of
punishment by execution. In addition, the direction
of the causal relationship between the rate of murder and the probabilities of conviction, apprehension and execution is not obvious, since a high
murder rate may generate an upward adjustment
in the levels of these probabilities in accordance
with optimal law enforcement. Thus the sign of the
simple correlation between the murder rate and the
' Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 685
(Mass. 1975) (Tauro, C.J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
70408 U.S. at 350 (Marshall, J., concurring).
7' Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 222.
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legal status, or even the effective use of capital

conclusive as either a rejection of Ehrlich's findings
or as an independent finding tending to establish
that there is no deterrence effect. The data used by
Bowers
and Pierce were not the same as that used
Furthermore, argue the Sellin critics, it was not
by
Ehrlich
since Ehrlich had not released his stapossible to have a random assignment of treatment
tistical
base
at that time.78 Furthermore, the interlevels in Sellin's comparative approach because the
vals
used
by
Bowers and Pierce were different from
data were not generated in a controlled experiment
Ehrlich's
study
since this study ended in 1963 and
and the choice of the state pairings was subjective
73
Ehrlich's
study
included data up to 1969.
and deliberate. In addition to the absence of
Passell1h estimated a cross-sectional model similaboratory conditions underlying Sellin's aplar to the cross-sectional equations of Ehrlich. This
proach, there are basic structural problems as well:
study focused on the years 1950 and 1960, comthe similar areas are not similar enough; the periods
pared to Ehrlich's concentration on 1940 and 1950.
are not long enough; many social differences and
Another significant difference between the two
changes, other than the abolition of the death penmodels is that Passell's deterrence variables were
alty, may account for the variation (or lack o) in
constructed somewhat differently. Passell's version
homicide rates with and without, before and after
included the perceived probability of punishment
abolition; some of these social differences and
(defined as the subjective probability of arrest and
74
changes are likely to have affected homicide rates.
the probability of conviction given arrest), the
Finally, it has been claimed that Sellin's matching length of the prison sentences of those convicted
technique also ignores the possible response of pun- but not executed, and the typical execution variishment policies to homicide rates-if a high or able. Other variables inserted in the equation were
rising homicide rate leads one state to institute the a demographic adjustment for age groups, an economic adjustment for income groups, and a social
death penalty and low or falling rates lead other
states to abolish it, retentionist states would tend and family relationship adjustment. Using both
to have higher homicide rates. This result by itself ordinary and two-stage least squares estimation
techniques, Passell found the execution rate to be
could cancel out a possible negative correlation
positive but insignificant, indicating no deterrent
which would be produced if the penalty were in
effect. Although Passell did utilize sophisticated
fact an effective deterrent.7 5
statistical techniques to achieve these results, he
Econometricians and the Death Penalty
nevertheless concluded that "it cannot be proven
There have been several major research efforts that executions do not serve as a deterrent to
which have econometrically tested the deterrence murder. Proof is simply beyond the capacities of
hypothesis of Ehrlich, but have arrived at contra- empirical social science. At a minimum, however,
students of capital punishment must ' look
elsewhere
dictory results. All of these models failed to find
'
0
deterrence.
confirming
evidence
for
any significant evidence that capital punishment
Forst also estimated a cross-sectional model, in
influences the homicide rate.
testing the Ehrlich results, but concentrated on the
The Bowers and Pierce study, for example, tested
years 1960 and 1970, representing a period when
the Ehrlich conclusions by attempting to duplicate
76
the rate of executions was falling dramatically but
Ehrlich's model. Specifically, this study focused
the homicide rate was rising8s These years were
on the criticism of Ehrlich that the deterrent effect
considered to be the best available to test the
disappears when certain years of data are deleted
from the analysis. The results indicated that the hypothesis that "to the extent that capital punishment deters homicides, the homicide rate should
coefficients of the deterrence variables are not neghave increased by the largest amounts from 1960
ative as expected, but rather are predominantly
positive and become even more so as additional to 1970, ceteris paribus, in those states with the
years are deleted.77 However, this study is not greatest reductions in the probability that a person
punishment, cannot provide conclusive evidence for
or against the existence of a deterrent effect. 2

72 Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 415.
73 For a critical analysis of Sellin's matching technique,

see Peck, supra note 44, at 364.
74Van den Haag, supra note 5, at 145-46.
Peck, supra note 44, at 364.
'"Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 204-05.
,7Id.

78 Since then, Ehrlich has apparently relented and
allowed Klein, Forst, and Filatov use of the data in their
study. See Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 352.
79Passell, note 2 supra
Id. at 79-80.
81Forst, note 2 supra.
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convicted of murder would be executed." Forst
included a wide range of variables in his equation
specifications, including Passell's three deterrence
factors and various social, demographic, and economic variables. Using ordinary least squares to
estimate the equations, Forst could not find any
support for the deterrence hypothesis with respect
to the risk of execution, although the probability
of conviction coefficient was negative and significant, suggesting that a higher risk of conviction
would serve as a more efficient deterrent force than
the risk of death. Although it has been suggested
that Forst's findings are spurious, they nevertheless
indicate that the certainty of punishment may be
a more effective deterrent than its severity.ss With
regard to executions alone, Forst went beyond
Passell and asserted affirmatively that
the finding that capital punishment ... does not
deter homicide is remarkably robust with respect to
a wide range of alternative constructions of the
execution rate, alternate assumptions about simultaneity among the crime and sanction variables,
whether or not the observations are weighted, and
the inclusion of different subsets of available control
variables.
The results of this analysis suggest ... that it is
erroneous to view capital punishment as a means of
reducing the homicide rate.84
While these econometric studies do seem to raise
questions regarding the Ehrlich findings, they are
subject to criticisms as well, including many discussed in relation to Ehrlich's methodology. Thus,
at this point, it is apparent that there is credible
empirical evidence on both sides concerning the
deterrence effect of capital punishment, although
no definitive study has yet been done. Furthermore,
it can hardly be asserted with certainty that any
empirical study will conclusively resolve the issue,
although additional empirical research will yield
valuable new evidence, permitting a more informed judgment to be made about this controversial issue. The next section presents the results of
another empirical attempt to isolate, identify and
measure econometrically the deterrent impact of
capital punishment on homicide rates.
ADDITIONAL EvIDENCE ON DETERRENCE

The following analysis has been purposefully
designed to account for many of the problems
identified in other econometric models and to in-

corporate methods aimed at ameliorating these
defects. As already noted, there are problems which
are inherent in attempting to estimate an econometric model of the death penalty, and this study
is no different. However, by accounting for the
criticisms of prior modeling efforts, this analysis
presents a new and theoretically more valuable
and acceptable approach.
Thus far, the statistical efforts aimed at isolating
the effects of capital punishment have proceeded
along three basic lines of inquiry: (1) econometric
models using time series; (2) cross-sectional data
studies; and (3) a matching or "paired-comparison" framework. An analytical scheme utilizing
time series is valuable because the movement over
time of independent or exogenous variables can
explain much of what "causally" determines any
dependent or endogenous variable. The principal
disadvantage of time series, however, is that in a
number of instances many of the key explanatory
variables may not be available either for a given
historical time period or for a sufficient length of
time to insure adequate degrees of freedom.
Cross-sectional analysis solves this problem by
allowing "the researcher to observe larger differences in the relevant factors, to control for specific
regional effects, and to include potentially important factors about which information is not available on an annual basis."so Yet, all of the crosssectional and time-series studies done so far have
failed to resolve the deterrence controversy, and
this has potentially serious implications:
The failure of these cross-sectional studies to find a
significant deterrent effect issimilar to discrepancies
that have arisen in econometric investigations of
consumer spending. In national time-series samples,
there is evidence of significant positive association,
at the margin, between an index of consumer attitudes and spending on durable goods; but in crosssection samples, with family-to-family variation,
this same effect cannot readily be found. This lack
of correspondence between the time-series and crosssection findings has always cast some doubt on the
validity of the former. It has also been the case that
significant time-series effects have not always carried over from sample to extrapolation. There have
been serious enough reversals in appraisals of the
macro-economy through methods based on timeseries that we may be led by analogy to mistrust the
policy extrapolation of Ehrlich's time series results
in the absence of cross-section
as well as other
a
confirmations of his findings.

2Id. at 749.
" Id. at 763.
4

Id. at 764.
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s Id. at 747 (footnotes omitted).
Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 342.
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However, by combining both of these analyses
into a technique known as pooled cross-sectional
time series analysis, a different analytical approach
may be taken in which less historical data are
needed because the cross-sectional data compensate for the loss in yearly information. Further, a
greater number of relevant variables can be included because of their increased availability. By
examining and comparing states and regions in a
way comparable to the matching technique of
Sellin, additional comparative information is obtained reflecting the relative deterrent impact of
capital punishment. Thus, it seems logical that the
next step in the attempt to estimate econometrically the influence of executions on homicides
should combine all three methodologies in order to
obtain additional evidence on this controversial
issue. As one economist has noted in critiquing the
work done thus far, a major improvement in this
field could be accomplished by applying econometric techniques to time-series data across states
or regions in ways which, to a considerable extent,
will bring the analysis closer to the paired-comparison method.87
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The approach taken in this attempt to test the
deterrence hypothesis involves ordinary least
squares in a pooled cross-sectional time-series
framework. The principal advantage is that movements of the dependent variable (the rate of homicide) can be explained by the variances of the
independent variables both over time and across
regions or states, thus providing additional information as to the true relationship existing between
variables. Although this approach does increase
the number of observations in a regression compared to the cross-sectional or time-series approach
alone, other things being equal, there is the disadvantage that it is not possible to correct for interdependencies among the variables by resort to twostage least squares.
Two basic situations are selected in which to test
the deterrence hypothesis. First, the national data
is disaggregated to a regional level to see if variations between various sections of the country offer
any additional evidence. In both the regional and
the state-by-state equations, the sophisticated pooling technique of cross-sectional data over time is
used. The second scenario involves an analysis of
state data; this level of disaggregation is designed
to discover what, if any, information can be ob"

Peck, supra note 44, at 367.
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tained by accounting for individual state experiences.
As is the case in many statistical studies, the
interval chosen for the period of estimation is dictated by the availability of data. In choosing the
interval, the goal is to isolate those years in which
the death penalty represents a commonly utilized
form of punishment. All years after 1960 are deleted for the equations since the number of executions fell dramatically during that decade, and
none occurred after 1967. The time span 1940 to
1960 seems best suited to fulfilling this goal; unfortunately, some of the relevant economic, demographic, and crime variables are not available during the earlier years on a state or regional basis.
For this reason, the regressions are performed over
the subperiod 1950-1960.
This approach to the choice of the estimation
interval is subject to the same criticism that Ehrlich's research has drawn, that is, that the elimination of certain years amounts to, in effect, the
selective, non-stochastic exclusion of observations
which are arguably crucial to a reliable estimation
of the key deterrence variables.ss "The principle
argument against changing the sample to investigate only the period up to 1962 is that valuable
statistical observations are lost-not simply the
observations that make the case, but observations
that contribute in a general way to the overall
number of degrees of freedom, which are precious,
and in short supply for the analysis of the problem
at hand."' Theoretically it is true that the nonrandom exclusion of data does eliminate valuable
information, but here this loss of data may not be
as critical an issue, since the deletion of observations and the information carried with them by
restricting the interval to 1950-1960 is offset by the
additional information gained through the use of
temporal cross-sectional data matrices.
Furthermore, even though the availability of
data is often a constraint on the estimation period
which can be selected, the estimated coefficients
are, other things being equal, expected to be unbiased in the ordinary least squares situation, although the confidence interval may be wider as a
result. Finally, if the death penalty really does have
a deterrent effect, the 1950-1960 time period represents a good interval over which to test the
hypothesis for several reasons. First, although the
Uniform Crime Reports do have reporting and
compilation deficiencies, this source is nevertheless
88 Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 209.
89Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 353.
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TABLE A
MNEUMONICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS

Variable

Mneumonic

O%N@
PA@
PGOC@US
E%US@
PEI
%NW15@24
%NW25@34
SGFNR@
NR@
RU
RUI6@19
RU20@24
N15@24
YP%N@
LC%NR

Level

homicide rate per 100,000 (murders and non-negligent manslaughters)
probability of apprehension (per cent of murders cleared by arrests)
conditional probability of being convicted of offense charged (murder)
given apprehension
per cent of executions occurring in the U.S. in a state or region
number of executions in a given year divided by number convicted in
previous year
per cent of nonwhites in varying population age groups

national, regional, state
national, regional
national

per capita government expenditures as reflected by tax revenues
resident population
national unemployment rate and the rate for selected age groups

national, regional, state
national, regional, state
national

per cent of U.S. population between 15 and 24
per capita income
labor force participation rate

national
national, regional, state
national

the best available and is generally considered to be
more accurate for post- 1950 periods than for earlier
years of publication."° Second, there is no significant trend in the use of capital punishment during
this period as compared to the 1960's. Finally, the
death penalty was still considered to be an acceptable form of punishment in the 1950's as compared
to the abolitionist trend of the 1960's.
As noted, the crime data used in these regressions
are taken from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
published by the Department of Justice. The only
exception is the number of executions, which is
compiled by the justice Department in the National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin. The economic
and social variables used in this analysis are from
three principal sources, the Bureau of the Census
(Commerce Department), the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Labor Department), and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (Commerce Department).
In all of the regressions, the dependent or endogenous variable is the rate of homicides (defined as
murders and non-negligent manslaughters) per
100,000 persons. The independent or exogenous
("explanatory") variables reflect the deterrent ef-fects of apprehension, conviction, and execution
and the impact of various economic/social/demographic factors.
As Table A illustrates, the first deterrence variable is the probability of being apprehended for
murder in the United States (PA@US) or in a
region (PA@ region); individual state data are not
9o Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 187-89.

regional, state
national
national

available for this concept. This probability is derived from the percentage of murders cleared by
arrests.91 PGOC@US is the conditional probability
of being convicted of the offense of murder given
apprehension for the entire United States. Since no
state or regional data is available for this concept,
the national variable is used in all levels of analysis.
This deterrence variable is measured by the number of persons found guilty once charged. Finally,
the conditional probability of being executed given
conviction is measured in two ways. First, for the
United States only, PE1 is the number of executions in a given year divided by the number convicted in the previous year. The variation of this
variable is the per cent of all executions in the
United States occurring in a given state (E%US@
state) or region (E%US@ region). This latter measure is designed to capture the effect, if any, of
publicity and the subjective fear of being executed
in a given state. The sign of each deterrent variable
is expected to be negative, and the magnitude of
the elasticities is expected to range from apprehension (largest) to executions (smallest).
The remaining explanatory variables are chosen
by hypothesizing which economic and social factors are most likely to exert significant influence on
the murder rate. Variables representing the per
cent of non-whites in varying population-age
groups (%NW15@24, %NW25@34) in the United
States are designed to isolate the effect of race
on homicide rates. Per capita state or regional
91 A murder is "cleared" for reporting purposes when
a suspect is actually arrested for that murder.
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TABLE B-I
REGIONAL BASIS: MURDER RATES REGRESSED AGAINST SELECTED VARIABLES

Vaibe(I

Variable

E.C.

S.E.

E.C.

(2)

S.E.

485.000
-376.063
602.500
-368.509
0.030
-0.032
0.031
-0.025
19.430
25.632
29.170
10.781
35.030
4.483
1.552
1.799
619.800
155.982
.506.400
-774.514
828.500
-642.389
7.696
0.847
7.755
2.235
2
0.096
0.133
0.096
0.150
NR
0.937
-0.712
RU
0.874
-0.643
RU 16@ 19
0.999
0.067
RU20@24
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
0.000
YP%N2
1corrected for first-order autocorrelation
2 regional variables
3
estimated in logarithms
"The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient divided by the standard error.
Constant
2
PA
PGOC@US
PEI
E%US
%NW15@24
%NW25@34
%NW15@34
2
SGF%NR

government expenditures on crime prevention
(SGF%NR@) is reflected by tax revenues, which
represent the budget constraint on what can be
spent.9' As such expenditures increase (as tax revenues increase), the murder rate should, other
things being equal, fall. The resident population of
a given area (available for state and regional levels)
is an indicator of the effects of population density
and tests the hypothesis that more murders will be
committed in more densely populated regions. The
overall national unemployment rate (RU) and the
unemployment rate for selected age groups
(RU16@19, RU20@24) are proxies for the effect
of economic cyclical behavior on well-being and
mental attitudes. YP%N is per capita income for
the United States and individual regions or states
and is included in the equations to identify the
relationship between homicide rates and the expectations resulting from different standards of living.
The labor force participation rate (LC%NR) also
may have an important influence as might the
resident population (NR) and the age distribution
of the population (N15@24).
The Deterrence Hypothesis at the Regional Level
At the regional level, the standard government classification is used to group the forty-fivewThe assumption underlying this hypothesis is that
as the amount available for government expenditure
increases, part of this amount will be channeled towards
crime prevention programs.

states:

93

(1950-1960)I
(3)3

E.C.

S.E. 4

-1018.590
0.021
0.784

489.000
0.416
1.784

-

-

0.063
-

0.230
-

-

49.219
-0.623
1.284
-

-6.935
2.258
0.006

-

25.990
0.194
0.335
-

2.102
1.525
0.012

E.C. = estimated coefficient
S.E. - standard error

Alaska and Hawaii are left out of both the

state and regional analysis, due to late statehood,
as are Vermont, North Dakota, and South Dakota,
because of poor or unavailable data. An advantage
of doing an analysis on a regional basis lies in the
fact that more crime data is available at this level
than on the state level. Application of a temporal
cross-sectional estimating format in a regional set9 The regions contain the following states:
NEW ENGLAND: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont
MIDDLE ATLANTIC: New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania
Indiana,
EAST NORTH CENTRAL: Illinois,
Michigan,
Ohio,
Wisconsin
WEST NORTH CENTRAL: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
North
Nebraska,
Dakota, South Dakota
SOUTH ATLANTIC: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Viiginia
KenEAST SOUTH CENTRAL: Alabama,
tucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee
LouisWEST SOUTH CENTRAL: Arkansas,
Oklahoma,
iana,
Texas
MOUNTAIN: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Wyoming
PACIFIC: California, Oregon, Washington
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ting has the further advantage of not only producing overall statistics from the principal equation
but also of permitting analysis of the individual
regions themselves with respect to the causal relationships specified in the equation. Ordinary least
squares is the regression technique used in these
estimations, and the equations have been corrected
for serial correlation.
Table B-I presents in a condensed form the
results of three regressions run on a regional level.
The left-hand variable in all the equations is once
again the rate of homicide per 100,000, and there
are nine explanatory variables. The first equation
includes as the execution variable the percent of
those executed in a given region to total executions
(PE1). Equation two substitutes regional measures
of the execution rate (EUS) for the national
measure. In addition, the race variables are combined into one (%NW15@34) and the unemployment rate is split into two age groups (RU16@19,
RU20@24). The third regression is the same as the
second except it is estimated in logarithms.
In these equations, both the execution and the
conviction rate variables are insignificant and positive. The substitution of execution measures
(E%US for PEI) does not significantly alter these
findings. Surprisingly, the probability of apprehension at the regional level is statistically insignificant
in all three specifications; this contrasts with the
substantial deterrence effect found at the state level
(see Tables -1, C-2, and C-3). Although the signs
of the estimated coefficients of several of the other
explanatory variables are different from what was
expected, most are not significant, and a high
degree of confidence cannot be placed in these
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results. When equation two is estimated in natural
logarithms (equation three), two variables change
signs (%NW15@34 and YP%N) while the coefficients of others become significant (SGF%NR, NR,
and RU16@19). This result does lend weight to
the criticism that Ehrlich's finding of a deterrent
effect of executions is nothing more than a statistical artifact arising from the use of logarithms.
Three more specifications are tested at the regional level, decreasing the number of variables
and thereby decreasing the multicollinearity which
may have existed in the above equations. Basically,
these equations contain the same variables used in
Ehrlich's time series analysis. The deterrence variables are the same as in Table B-I except PEI is
used throughout. The remaining explanatory variables include the labor force participation rate,
the unemployment rate, per capita personal income, and the per cent of the population between
ages fifteen and twenty-four. Equation four is estimated using modified first differences, equation
five borrows the specification of four but uses levels,
and equation six is merely equation five expressed
in natural logarithms.
Even based on Ehrlich's original specification,
no evidence of deterrence results from these estimations (see Table B-2). There are many different
explanations for this, including the fact that executions may not be a deterrent at all with respect
to homicides. The equations in Table B-2 use five
national variables but only two regional variables
to explain regional homicide rates. In this regard,
using national trends to explain regional variances
may cause the overall effect of the explanatory
variable to be negated or entirely deleted. The

TABLE B-2
REGIONAL BASIS: MURDER RATE REGRESSED AGAINST SELECTED VARIABLES (LEVELS,

1950-1960 FIRsT

DIFFERENCES,

1951-1960)'
Variable

E.C.

S.E.

E.C.

S.E.

0.455
0.281
750.979
446.700
Constant
-0.083
0.358
-0.023
0.030
PA4
14.282
24.740
-0.111
0.212
PGOC@US
29.180
0.146
0.075
3.106
PEI
188.400
2.292
2.125
431.070
LC%NR
0.761
-0.129
0.072
-0.607
RU
-1.074
0.680
1.940
0.988
YP%N 4
-0.023
0.016
-1.581
1.146
N15@24
1corrected for first-order autocorrelation
2 estimated in first-differences
3 estimated in logarithms
4 regional variables
5The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient divided by the standard error.

E.C.

S.E. s

80.749
-0.004
2.596
0.263
-1.557
-38.476
-0.015
-5.002

81.790
0.005
1.847
0.545
0.662
12.666
0.012
3.681
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problem of omitted variables is also significant.
The homicides which have the greatest potential
for deterrence are murders for hire or those which
are premeditated and deliberated. There is no
variable to account for those homicides which are
spontaneous, provoked, or based on passion.
This regional analysis is based on the additional
information obtained from combining cross-sectional and time-series analyses and introducing
regional variables. Thus, despite the above problems, this disaggregated approach nevertheless does
provide new research findings concerning the existence of a deterrent effect. However, given the
subperiod selected, the variables tested, and the
regional focus, the hypothesis that capital punishment does deter homicides cannot be accepted on
the basis of the regression evidence presented in
this part of the study. There is one further level of
disaggregation that can be used as a basis for
testing this hypothesis. A regression analysis based
on state data provides even more bits of information than one based on regional data and would
seem to be the most favorable framework of the
possible data levels in which to test the Ehrlich
deterrence hypothesis.
The Deterrence Hypothesis at the State Level
By examining the data for forty-five states over
a ten-year period, it is possible to increase the
number of observations in the estimation to 495 as
compared to 99 on the regional level. These additional pieces of information should provide additional reliable evidence as to the existence or nonexistence of a deterrent effect.
In structuring the equations to be estimated at
the state level, no attempt is made to reestimate
Ehrlich's equation using state data. Instead, a hypothesis is formulated and then tested, and the
results are presented as estimated. In most of the
equations, there are statistically insignificant variables which do not appear in other studies. The
reason for the presence of such variables may be
due to misspecification of the equation itself, or it
could be a result of the absence of "data mining."
In other words, these equations are not estimated
on a trial-and-error basis. There are underlying
reasofis for the inclusion of each variable, and
justifications for what the magnitude and sign of
each estimated coefficient is expected to be. Undoubtedly, a better fit could have been obtained
by dropping the insignificant variables in a succession of equations until finally arriving at the "best"
fit in terms of t-statistics and other descriptive
measures. However, this process, often done but

APPROACH

seldom admitted, may theoretically bias the results,
since a hypothesized relevant variable is deleted
from the equation and a new estimation performed
with fewer variables. This produces the problem of
omitting variables which were originally hypothesized as theoretically justifiable and relevant.
Table C-1 presents the results of the primary
equation estimated on a state level. The dependent
variable again is the rate of homicides per 100,000
persons in a given state.The three usual deterrence
variables are included in the equation, although
each reflects national, not state, trends. The sign of
each is expected to be negative. Six additional
explanatory variables are in the final specification,
three of which represent state-specific economic,
social, and demographic factors. The three national
variables are the per cent of non-whites between
the ages of 15-24 and 25-34 and the unemployment
rate. The race variables are hypothesized to be
positively related to homicides as is the unemployment rate. The three state variables include government expenditures per capita (expected to have
a negative correlation), resident population (postulated to have a positive influence on homicides),
and per capita income (expected to have a negative
influence).
Two of the three deterrence variables are not
only insignificant but also have the wrong sign (see
Table C-I). Only the probability of being apprehended reflects any deterrent impact at all. This
result is in accord with other studies mentioned
above which found no deterrent effect in execution,
TABLE C-I
STATE BASIS: MURDER RATES REGRESSED AGAINST
SELECTED VARIABLES

Independent
Variables

Constant'
PA@US
PGOC@US
PEI
%NW15@24
%NW25@34
SGF%NR 2
NR 2
RU
YP%N 2

(1950-1960)

Estimated
Coefficient'

Standard
Error

-350.225
-1.528
9.793
10.833
-343.448
-89.385
-4.610
0.057
-0.511

184.500
0.552
13.380
14.760
372.600
226.400
7.446
0.154
0.384

0.064

1.407

I corrected for first-order autocorrelation
2 state-specific variables
3 each state equation has its own individual intercept
(constant term)

' The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient
divided by the standard error.
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but which did conclude that the subjective probability of being caught and convicted may play a
powerful role in deterring criminal behavior. The
signs of some of the other variables are also different from what was predicted. However, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are so large
that no confidence can be placed in these signs or
in the magnitudes of the coefficients.
Table C-2 displays the results of a second specification containing a different measure of the death
penalty variable (the per cent of total executions
occurring in each state), only one racial variable
combining the age distribution (NW15@34) but
now on a percentage change basis, and two unemployment rates also based on age (RU16@19,
RU20@24). The major difference, however, is that
the conviction rate is dropped from the equation
in order to isolate and estimate better the impact
of the two remaining deterrence variables. The
estimation results are not significantly different
from the regression in Table C-1. The apprehension rate is again negative and significant while the
execution rate is not statistically different from
zero.
The final hypothesis tested focuses on those states
which retained the death penalty during the 1950's.
The five abolitionist states deleted from the equation are Maine, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. The hypothesis tested is that
one reason the retentionist states have retained the
death penalty as a form of punishment may be
because it achieves the socially desirable goal of

TABLE C-2
STATE BASIS: MURDER RATES REGRESSED AGAINST
SELECTED VARIABLES

Independent
Variables
Constant 3
PA@US
E%US@ 2
%NW15@34
SGF%NR@ 2
RUI6@19
RU20@24
NR@ 2
YP%N@ 2

(1950-1960)

Estimated
Coefficient'

Standard
Error4

-280.004
- 1.252
-0.037
-327.575
-5.494
-0.028
-0.218
0.062
0.077

137.200
0.429
3.175
391.200
7.379
0.327
0.379
0.155
1.405

' corrected for first-order autocorrelation
2 state-specific variables
3 each state equation has an individual intercept (constant term) not shown
4The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient
divided by the standard error.
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TABLE C-3
STATE

BASIS:

RETENTIONIST STATES MURDER RATES AND

SELECTED VARIABLES

Independent
Variables

Estimated
Coefficient'

(1950-60)
Standard
Error4

Constant 3
-315.236
156.100
PA@US
-1.192
0.474
EUS@2
-0.280
3.206
%NW15@34
-490.105
426.300
-7.136
7.882
SGF%NR@2
RU16@19
0.044
0.362
RU20@24
-0.291
0.420
0.052
0.166
NR@ 2
2
1.479
0.560
YP%N@
corrected for first-order serial correlation
2 state-specific variables
3
each state equation has an individual intercept (constant term) (not shown)
4The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient
divided by the standard error.
deterrence. The specification estimated is the same
as in Table C-2, and the results are presented in
Table C-3. There appears to be no significant
difference between all of the states and just the
retentionist states with respect to deterrence. Apprehension again provides the only evidence of
deterrence, while the execution variable remains
insignificant.
In summary, these state equations offer no evidence that the deterrence hypothesis with respect
to executions should be accepted. This finding is
surprising in that the methodology employed in
this study would seemingly favor Ehrlich's hypothesis for two reasons: first, much more information
is available through the use of a temporal crosssectional analysis and the reliance on state and
regional data to isolate and clarify further the
relationship between the death penalty and homicides, and second, the interval chosen is favorable
in that executions were still an acceptable and
widely used form of punishment.
The estimated equations do not, however, contain strictly state-specific data. To estimate state
variables more efficiently and accurately, state data
on the apprehension, conviction, and execution
rates and on the economic/social/demographic
factors are essential. Until such data are available,
the true relationships between variables may tend
to be obscured by this mix of state and national
variables. The inclusion of a global or national
variable in an equation with a state-based dependent variable implicitly assumes that the effect of
the national variable will be uniform across all
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states; this may not be true with respect to the
deterrence variables tested here.

able doubt, they have succeeded in showing by
clear and convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to crime
in our
97
ANALYTICAL AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
own society. This is all they must do.,
All that is really clear is that studies such as this
The analysis undertaken above seems to lead to
the conclusion that the "efficacy of capital punish- one have failed to find evidence sufficient to prove
ment ...to deter others from crime remains a the deterrence hypothesis. This is, of course, quite
different from proving that executions have no
matter about which reasonable men and reasonable legislators may easily differ."' ' Statistical stud- deterrent effect. In testing the hypothesis and reies and tests have not been satisfactorily conclusive jecting it, all that can be said is that the deterrence
either way. "The deterrent effect of capital punish- theory cannot be accepted, not that the converse is
ment is definitely not a settled matter, and this is true. No evidence of deterrence could be found in
the strongest social scientific conclusion that can this research but the results are not conclusive
be reached at the present time."9' The hypotheses either way. This is not to say, however, that such
tested in this study are intentionally designed and evidence is unobtainable, although one observer
has commented that, in light of the shortcomings
specified in such a way that if capital punishment
is a deterrent, this data should prove it. In none of inherent in these deterrence studies, it may be
the equations, however, could the death penalty be doubtful "that the presence or absence of a deterregarded as an effective deterrent. Only the prob- rent effect of the death penalty is likely to be
demonstrable by statistical means. '
ability of apprehension could be found significant
This conclusion does not seem to be a very
and even then only on the state level.
Indeed, the proper question might be not satisfactory way in which to end an inquiry. What
is at stake in these attempts at resolving this issue
whether executions do or do not deter homicides,
but rather, given the available data and the prob- are human lives, and a rational and morally aclems involved in estimation, whether the use of ceptable policy requires, even demands, additional
statistical techniques can settle the issue or perhaps evidence and information (statistical or otherwise)
upon which a proper evaluation of the deterrence
even whether they should be allowed to do so.'
Even though there is no clear statistical evidence impact of the death penalty may be made. The
to resolve the debate conclusively, such evidence only rationale left to support capital punishment
has been used, often inappropriately, as a basis for is deterrence, and so far the only evidence favoring
a judgment most likely already formed. Justice this rationale is the work of Ehrlich. It does not
Marshall, concurring in Furman, interprets such seem reasonable to weigh lives against such quesinconclusive evidence to favor the abolitionists by tionable statistics and find in favor of the numbers.
In considering the evidence, a policy judgment
deciding that "[d]espite the fact that abolitionists
have not proved non-deterrence beyond a reason- may well depend on who has the burden of proof,
the abolitionists or retentionists. Given the context
of permanent and irreversible punishments, the
94Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 355 (1976)
answer is clear. Not only has the theory of deter(White, J., dissenting).
9 Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 359.
rence been subject to intense criticism, but also the
96However, it is not at all clear that the courts will use of capital punishment has been critically quesrely on or even use this evidence in testing the constitutionality of a death penalty statute. justice White, dis- tioned as to its desirability in a society espousing
the goal of rehabilitation and not retribution. The
senting in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976),
observed:
retentionists have the obligation, both morally and
It will not do to denigrate these legislativejudgments
politically, to find conclusive evidence that the
as some form of vestigial savagery or as purely
execution of a convicted murderer will deter others
retributive in motivation; for they are solemn judgfrom committing the same crime. Although it has
ments, reasonably based, that imposition of the
been suggested that such statistical evidence is just
death penalty will save the lives of innocent persons.
This concern for life and human values and the
not possible to find, this does not in any way
sincere efforts of the States to preserve them are
change the situation. Until it is conclusively shown
matters of the greatest moment with which the
that there is a compelling and justifiable state
judiciary should be most reluctant to interfere.
interest in overriding the fundamental goal of preId. at 355 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart expressed a similar view in his concurring opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 234-35
9 408 U.S. at 353 (Marshall, J., concurring).
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
98 Van den Haag, supra note 5, at I.
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serving human life, the death penalty is, from a
policy standpoint, an unacceptable means of punishment.
The only policy judgment that can be made
based on this analysis is that the probability of
apprehension is the only deterrence variable which
has any effect at all. This finding reinforces in some
ways the conclusion of one study which argued
that
the appropriate criminal justice policy is one which
attempts t6 reduce crime by increasing the probability of apprehension and prosecution. This would
have the advantage of not only increasing the level
of general deterrence, but might also result in an
increased sense of the fairness
of punishment and
9
lower rates of recidivism.
99 Antunes & Hunt, The Impact and Certainty and Severity
of Punishment on Levels of Crime in American States: An
Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 486, 493 (1973)

(footnotes omitted).
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If the certainty of apprehension for committing
a crime like murder, which carries with it a severe
sentence rises, then the findings suggest that homicides will fall. In light of this analysis, increased
attention, research, and expenditures in this area
of crime prevention should be chosen over executions justified only by a questionable deterrence
theory.
The purpose of this comment has been to evaluate and critique the existing evidence of the deterrent effects of the death penalty and attempt to
add additional information by utilizing a different
approach to the issue. If anything can be concluded
from the foregoing, it is that the deterrence hypothesis may have no real basis in fact. Therefore,
attempts to justify the use of capital punishment
by relying on this theory must be carefully examined and evaluated, since the consequences of accepting such a justification as legitiiaate is literally
a matter of life or death.
STEPHEN J. KNORR

